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3Abstract. The introduced dispersal-foraging game is a combination of prey habi-1
tat selection among two patch types and optimal foraging approaches. Prey's patch2
preference and forager behavior determine the prey's survival rate. The forager's3
energy gain depends on local prey density in both types of exhaustible patches and4
on leaving time.5
We introduce two game solution concepts. The static solution combines the ideal6
free distribution of the prey with optimal foraging theory. The dynamical solution7
is given by a game dynamics, describing the behavioral changes of prey and forager.8
We show that (a) each stable equilibrium dynamical solution is always a static9
solution, but not conversely; (b) at an equilibrium dynamical solution, the forager10
can stabilize prey mixed patch use strategy in cases where ideal free distribution11
theory predicts that prey will use only one patch type; (c) when the equilibrium12
dynamical solution is unstable at xed prey density, stable behavior cycles occur13
where neither forager nor prey keep a xed behavior.14
41 Introduction15
Although the foraging strategy of prey under predation risk is well studied (e.g.16
Brown and Kotler 2004), the predator's role is not as thoroughly investigated (Lima17
2002). This is in spite of the fact that predation is an interaction between quite18
counter-interested species: prey and predator. We consider an optimal foraging19
predator (shortly forager) and a prey dispersing among patches. In order to guar-20
antee that competition for food between prey does not mask the eect of predation,21
we assume this food competition can be neglected. Our aim is to introduce a game22
along with an appropriate solution concept for this ecological situation. We combine23
optimal foraging theory with ideal free distribution (IFD), considering one forager24
individual and its one prey species dispersing in two dierent patch types.25
We start from the following two basic optimal foraging models: In the prey-26
choose model (Charnov 1976a), the forager chooses among prey with dierent han-27
dling times, and the zero-one-rule holds (when the more protable prey is abundant,28
the forager ignores the other prey type; when the rst type is less abundant, then29
the forages uses both prey types). This model is strictly based on the idea of Holling30
functional response (Holling 1959): the handling times of dierent prey have a cru-31
cial eect on the number of killed prey. In the patch-use model (Charnov 1976b), the32
forager chooses the leaving time from an exhausted patch, and Charnov's marginal33
value theorem is valid (forager leaves the patch at that time where its energy intake34
rate once in the patch matches its energy intake rate from all patches). In this mod-35
el, the leaving time (which is the analogue of the handling time in the rst Charnov36
model) is a strategy of forager and so the function response is slightly generalized as37
it now depends on the patch leaving times as well as the density of prey. These two38
models combine to form a single optimal foraging model (Stephens and Krebs 1986;39
McNamara et al. 1993) whose theory is mainly built on Holling type II functional40
response (Stephens and Krebs 1986). At the rst glance, the zero-one-rule and the41
Charnov's marginal value theorem appear quite dierent. However, our basic in-42
5tuition is that both are consequences of one basic rule (see rule of time average in43
Section 3.1, cf. McNamara 1982).44
The IFD aims to understand species distribution in several patches under the45
assumption that moving between patches is time and energy free (Fretwell and46
Lucas 1969; Krivan et al. 2008). The IFD is characterized as a distribution where47
individual tnesses in all occupied patches are equal and at least as high as in any48
unoccupied patch (e.g. Abrams et al. 2007). Although originally the IFD considered49
species' tness based on the resource levels in each patch, we assume prey tness50
is determined by predation risk in the dierent types of patches (e.g. Cressman51
et al. 2004). In these models, the stability of the IFD is determined by concavity or52
convexity. Specically, if the functional response at current prey density is concave53
(e.g. either Holling II or Holling III with high prey density), then the prey will use54
only one patch type. If the functional response is convex (Holling III with small prey55
density), the prey use both type of patches (see e.g. Cressman and Garay 2009).56
In our model, the optimal forager is pitted against the prey's optimal distribu-57
tion. Since the predator and its prey have counteracting interests, game theory is58
required to nd the common optimal behavior (Cressman and Garay 2011). Op-59
timal foraging theory and IFD are based on the assumption that the other species60
(i.e. prey and forager, respectively) has xed behavior. In the natural union of these61
models, we seek a solution of this game so that both models hold at the same time.62
This solution is strictly based on the assumption that only one player can change63
its behavior at a time (see the static solution concept based on Nash Equilibrium64
(NE) in Section 3).65
However, the forager and its prey can adjust their behaviors to the opponent's66
current strategy immediately (e.g. Juliana et al. 2011; Katz et al. 2010, 2013). In67
other words, in biology we cannot assume that only one player changes its strategy68
while the other player's strategy is xed. It may seem unimportant whether it is69
only one or both players who can change strategy at a given time. But, mathe-70
6matically, these cases are quite dierent as we will see. From the biomathematical71
perspective, it is then reasonable to describe the changing behaviors of players by a72
game dynamics, in which players change strategy according to its opponent strat-73
egy either one at a same time or simultaneously (see dynamical solution concepts74
in Section 4). Using behavior dynamics has three theoretical consequences: First,75
from a game theoretical point of view, the game solution concept of Nash is slightly76
generalized.77
Secondly, from the biological point of view, behavioral cycles are possible in78
game dynamics whereas static solutions can predict only equilibrium outcomes. For79
instance, in the classical battle-of-the-sexes game (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998), be-80
havioral cycles occur when the NE is a mixed strategy. That behavioral cycles based81
on changing population densities have an important role in the study of species' co-82
existence among patches is also well-known by many researchers (a partial list is83
Abrams 2010; Abrams and Matsuda 2004; Abrams et al. 2007; Cressman and Kri-84
van 2013; Cressman et al. 2004; Fryxell and Lundberg 1994, 1998). The novelty of85
the present paper is the introduction of a new game between the optimal forager and86
its dispersing prey in a short enough time scale that changes in prey density can be87
ignored (as is assumed in optimal foraging theory). The behavioral cycles we nd at88
xed density generalize those in cellular automata models of spatial predator-prey89
dynamics (e.g. Molina et al. 2013) when the interaction is local and the system is90
not well mixed.91
Lastly, the dynamical solution concept predicts that the forager can stabilize92
prey mixed patch use in cases where the static solution concept (given by standard93
IFD theory under the assumption that forager does not change its xed mixed patch94
preference) predicts that prey use only one patch. The reasoning is as follows; if95
prey use only one type of patch, then an optimal forager, by changing its behavior,96
will only use this type too. Thus, prey survival rate is maximal in the other patch97
type and so the prey can use this patch type as a \refuge". Thus the prey will98
7use the second patch type as well (see results in Section 5). This line of reasoning99
suggests using experiments and/or eld observations to check which game-theoretic100
solution concept (i.e. static or dynamic) is valid.101
In Section 2, we introduce a mechanistic prey dispersal and predator enter-102
and-leave game, called the Dispersal-Foraging Game (DFG). In Sections 3 and 4,103
we study two solution concepts for DFG. We then compare these solution concepts104
(Section 5) before the nal Discussion section.105
2 Dispersal-foraging game106
To build the DFG model among dierent types of patches, the possible behaviors107
(i.e. strategies) of both the forager and its prey must be described as well as the108
eects that these behavioral choices have on individual tnesses (i.e. payos). These109
concepts are based on the system habitat and the foraging time duration.110
Habitat : Consider a system that consists of two types of patches with y1 (re-111
spectively, y2) the number of patches of type A1 (respectively, A2). We assume112
that dierent types of patches are well-mixed (in particular, the dierent types are113
not geographically segregated) and so, by a random walk, the forager encounters a114
random series of patches with relative frequencies d1 =
y1
y1+y2
and d2 =
y2
y1+y2
for the115
two types. The reader may think of the prey occupying two host plant species that116
are scattered randomly in a forest (i.e. each plant is then a patch). The patch types117
then determine dierent ecological conditions for the foraging process.118
Foraging time duration: Foraging time duration is denoted by T . This time119
interval T is considerably shorter than the reproduction time of prey. Furthermore,120
the forager is certain to survive but can only visit a small percentage of the y1 + y2121
patches. In fact, T is short enough that the strategic decisions taken by the forager122
and prey have constant tness consequences throughout this time interval (i.e. the123
consequences are independent of when the decisions occur). More details of this are124
8given in the following discussion of behaviors and payos. We emphasize that this125
time independence is the Basic Condition needed for the derivation of the payo126
functions.127
Prey behavior : To satisfy Charnov's assumption that the forager's energy gain128
from a given patch is an increasing function of time spent there, we assume that129
prey do not ee to other patches during forager attacks. Before the forager arrives,130
prey occupy the patches. Let x denote the total number of prey and s be the average131
patch preference strategy of the whole prey population (i.e. sx and (1  s) x prey132
are in patches of type A1 and A2, respectively). For simplicity, assume the local prey133
density x1 in each type A1 patch is the same (i.e. x1 =
sx
y1
) and the prey density in134
each type A2 patch is exactly x2 =
(1 s)x
y2
. In particular, we do not consider random135
prey distribution within a given patch type (e.g. Iwasa et al. 1981; Stewart-Oaten136
1982).137
Thus, the prey strategy, characterized by the choice 0  s  1, is straightfor-138
ward. The same cannot be said for the forager. To emphasize the game-theoretic139
aspect of our model, we will make simplifying assumptions on its possible behaviors140
in the following.141
Forager behavior : The foraging process involves several steps. In the rst step,142
the forager spends time 0 nding a patch at an energy cost c. We assume that143
the forager does not visit the same patch twice in time period T ; and the patch144
encounter probabilities will not depend on the foraging strategy (i.e. d1 and d2 are145
constant encounter probabilities with patch A1 and A2; respectively).146
Following the standard assumption in classical optimal foraging theory (e.g.147
Stephens and Krebs 1986 p. 17), on nding a patch, assume the forager immedi-148
ately recognizes the patch type. The forager then makes two conditional decisions:149
whether to enter the recognized patch or not and how long to stay in the chosen150
patch. a) \Enter strategy": Let pi 2 [0; 1] ; i = 1; 2 denote the probability to en-151
ter an encountered Ai patch (cf. Charnov 1976a,b) \Leave strategy": Let i  0;152
9i = 1; 2 denote the time period spent by the forager once an Ai patch is entered (cf.153
Charnov 1976b).154
We now have the possible behaviors of the forager and its prey and are in155
a position to determine the forager's tness by nding its expected energy intake156
during time T . Specically, the prey population has strategy s 2 [0; 1] and the157
forager's strategy is (p; ) where p := (p1; p2) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1] and  := (1; 2) 2158
[0; T ]  [0; T ]. These are indicated in the Dispersal-Foraging Game tree of Figure159
1. This tree also includes the information necessary to calculate tness (see also160
Cressman et al. (2014) who develop a general method based on such decision trees).161
162
Payo function for forager : Since optimal foraging theory postulates that the163
forager maximizes its average net energy intake per unit time (Turelli et al. 1982),164
forager payo is taken as this intake rate. When the forager enters an Ai patch,165
the net energy gain from the prey, gi(xi; i), depends on the local prey density xi166
there and the amount of time i that the forager spends in this patch. Biologically167
reasonable properties of this function are that it is increasing in both xi and i and168
that gi(xi; 0) = gi(0; i) = 0 (Stephens and Krebs 1986).169
For xed behavior and encounter probabilities, Figure 1 provides the activity170
distribution. For example, if the forager encounters an A1 patch and enters it,171
this activity occurs with probability d1p1; etc. Since we assume that the players'172
strategies, s 2 [0; 1] ; pi 2 [0; 1] ; i  0; the parameters di, x, and the gain functions173
gi (i = 1; 2) do not change during time T , the expected time duration E() of an174
activity chosen at random is given by175
E() = 0 + d1p11 + d2p22. (1)
The corresponding calculation of the expected energy intake of an activity chosen176
at random simplies to177
E(G) = d1p1g1(s; x; 1) + d2p2g2(s; x; 2)  c; (2)
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d1 d2
Find A1, x1(s)
p1 1−p1
Find A2, x2(s)
p2 1−p2
Activities Use A1 Not Use A1 Use A2 Not Use A2
Probability d1p1 d1(1− p1) d2p2 d2(1− p2)
Time duration τ0 + τ1 τ0 τ0 + τ2 τ0
Energy intake g1(x1(s), τ1)− c −c g2(x2(s), τ2)− c −c
Figure 1: With xed strategies of the \players", the tree of the game contains all
information to calculate the payo of the forager. At the rst level, di denotes the
probability that forager nds patch Ai, where the local density of prey xi(s) depends
on the average patch preference (s) of the whole prey population. At the second
level, pi denotes the enter strategy of forager into patch Ai. This tree generates
the activity distribution of forager. Each endpoint of the tree corresponds to one
activity. One observer can collect the probability of each activity, the time duration
of each activity (depending on the forager's leaving strategy i) and energy intake
of each activity. Based on this information, we can calculate the strategy dependent
functional response and so, the net energy intake rate of forager.
where c is the xed energy cost of nding a patch. Based on our Basic Condition178
that encounter (and thus activity) probabilities do not change during T , Garay and179
Mori (2010), using Wald's equality (Wald 1944), show that the forager's expected180
payo function is (see Appendix A)181
	(s; p; ) :=
E(G)
E()
=
d1p1g1(s; x; 1) + d2p2g2(s; x; 2)  c
0 + d1p11 + d2p22
: (3)
This is the average net energy intake rate of a randomly chosen activity (i.e. the182
average net energy intake per average time duration of one activity). We emphasize183
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that the Basic Condition holds under the assumptions of our patch model (i.e. no184
further simplifying assumptions are needed) since the probability of nding a patch185
does not depend on the forager's strategy and the forager never visits the same patch186
twice. Hence, the proportion of patch types among visited and among non-visited187
patches is the same and also unchanged during T . We note that if the energy unit188
is dened as the energy gain from one prey and the cost c is negligible, then 	 is a189
functional response.190
Clearly, staying longer in a given patch increases the food gain from this patch191
type and also increases the expected time duration E() even though it decreases192
the number of searches during T . The main point is that, from (1) and (2), staying193
longer can change E(G) and E() simultaneously and so it is unclear whether such194
a choice is to the forager's benet. Similar qualitative eects result from changing195
other strategies as well (even the prey strategy!).196
Payo functions for prey : While the forager is trying to optimize its intake rate,197
prey want to avoid being killed. For simplicity, assume prey are only killed by the198
forager (i.e. without the forager, each prey is certain to survive in a given patch).199
If we further assume that individual prey tness in the two patch types dier only200
through their interactions with the forager, then the payo of an individual prey can201
be measured by its survival probability (cf. Garay and Varga 2011). To this end,202
let  be the forager's energy intake when one prey is killed. (Here we ignore the203
possibility that there may also be an energy cost of foraging, which is often assumed204
to increase linearly with respect to time spent in the patch (Stephens and Krebs205
1986) ). Thus gi(s;x;i)

gives the average number of prey killed in an encountered Ai206
patch. Moreover, by another application of Wald's equality, the expected number of207
prey in Ai patches killed per unit time is
dipi
0+d1p11+d2p22
gi(s;x;2)

and so the individual208
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survival rate of prey in an Ai patch (i.e. their payo) is then209
1(s; x; p; ) = 1  d1p1
0 + d1p11 + d2p22
g1(s; x; 1)
xs
y1
(4)
2(s; x; p; ) = 1  d2p2
0 + d1p11 + d2p22
g2(s; x; 2)
x(1 s)
y2
:
It is important to point out here that there is an essential dierence between210
prey and forager payo functions, i and 	 respectively. Specically, whereas the211
forager's payo does not depend on another forager's strategy and so the forager212
optimizes its behavior given prey strategy s, the survival rate of a given prey type213
depends on the strategies used by other prey, i.e. for the prey, we have a population214
game (cf. Broom and Rychtar 2013).215
The above prey and predator behaviors together with their payo functions216
dene the DFG as a union of IFD and Charnov's two models of optimal foraging217
theory. The assumptions underlying DFG and these components are identical. More218
precisely, if we x the predator behavior, then we get back the IFD from DFG, and if219
we x the prey behavior we get back the optimal foraging model from DFG. Now the220
theoretical problem arises: What is the solution concept for DFG? We investigate221
two possibilities in Sections 3 and 4, respectively, when prey and their predator222
cannot change their strategies at the same time, and when these strategies change223
simultaneously.224
3 Static solution concepts based on Nash paradig-225
m226
The Nash equilibrium (NE) is a solution concept for games involving two (or more)227
players, in which no player can gain by changing his own strategy while the other228
player keeps his strategy xed. Following the Nash paradigm, let us assume that229
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either only prey or only forager can change its strategy at a particular time. Then,230
the strategy pair s and (p;  ) is a static solution, if the following two conditions,231
(5) and (6), hold.232
a) Solution for prey : With forager strategy xed at (p;  ), the prey are engaged233
in a single-species habitat selection game (Cressman et al. 2004). (Cressman et al.234
2004). As stated in the Introduction, s is an IFD (as introduced by Fretwell and235
Lucas (1969) Fretwell & Lucas(1969) before its connection with evolutionary game236
theory was recognized) if (i) prey payos in all occupied patches are the same and237
(ii) this payo is at least as high as that in any unoccupied patch. That is,238
i(s
; x; p;  )  j(s; x; p;  ) (5)
for all i; j whenever a patch of type Ai is occupied. With predator strategy xed at239
(p;  ), condition (5) is equivalent to s being a NE of the prey habitat selection240
game as shown by Cressman and Krivan (2006). That is, an IFD s is a NE.241
Applying the IFD denition to our two-patch model, prey may use both patch242
types at the IFD if the survival rate is the same in both. In general, however,243
equality in survival rate of prey does not imply that forager's gain from dierent244
patches are also equal. For instance, the prey patch preference does not take account245
varying searching costs of the forager in dierent patches.246
b) Solution for forager : When prey strategy is xed at s, the predator is faced247
with an optimization problem since its payo only depends on its own strategy. The248
NE is then the classical optimization solution (p;  ) (Stephens and Krebs 1986)249
called the optimal foraging strategy. That is, for any other strategy (p; ) we have250
	(s; p;  )  	(s; p; ): (6)
The static solution concept that combines (5) and (6) seems natural since it simply251
unies, under Nash paradigm, the IFD concept from the prey habitat selection game252
with the forager optimal foraging strategy.253
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Appendix C provides insight into the stability properties of the static solution254
IFD concept for the prey. We nd that if both gain functions are convex in s255
(like Holling III at small prey density), there is a unique mixed IFD and it is an256
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Thus prey use both patch types. On the other257
hand, if both gain functions are concave in s (like Holling II), then there is at least258
one IFD that is also an ESS with all prey using only one patch type. There may259
also be a mixed IFD but this cannot be an ESS since it is not stable.260
For the remainder of this section, we further examine the static solution concept261
for the forager.262
3.1 Forager's rule of time average based on Nash equilibri-263
um264
Let us consider the problem as generally as possible in the context of optimal foraging265
theory: Denote by 1 2 S1 and 2 2 S2 strategy choices of two players. In our case,266
player one (the forager) has a multi-dimensional strategy set S1 and player two is the267
prey. The forager optimizes its energy intake rate. Formally, to dene this rate, we268
have to consider two functions: T (1; 2) is the average time duration and G (1; 2)269
is the average energy intake when the players use the strategy pair (1; 2). The270
payo function of the forager is then  1 (1; 2) :=
G(1;2)
T (1;2)
. Since we concentrate271
here on the NE behavior of the forager, the payo function  2 for the second player272
can be arbitrary and its strategy xed at 2. If the optimal foraging behavior 

1273
is unique (for example, the inequality in (6) is strict), the forager's payo decreases274
whenever its strategy changes, while the other player's strategy is xed (formally275
 1 (

1; 

2) >  1 (1; 

2) ; for 1 6= 1). In game-theoretic terms, (1; 2) is a strict276
NE with respect to the behavior of player one.277
If the forager changes its strategy, there are two consequences: intake changes278
by DG (1) := G (1; 

2)  G (1; 2); and time duration changes by DT (1) :=279
T (1; 

2)   T (1; 2), simultaneously. In Appendix B, an elementary proof shows280
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that (1; 

2) is a strict NE (with respect to forager behavior) if and only if281
DG (1)T (

1; 

2) < DT (1)G (

1; 

2) (7)
for any other forager strategy 1. In particular, if there is no dierence in the time282
duration of strategies 1 and 

1 (i.e. DT (1) = 0), then the energy intake must283
be higher at the strict NE. We note that (7) is a version McNamara's potential284
function (1982) : \the expected future gain on a patch minus the expected loss due285
to lost time: time which could be spent on other patches foraging at mean rate".286
From (7), we have the following two rules:287
"+Rule of time average" If the forager's strategy change increases the time288
duration (i.e. DT (1) > 0), the average intake rate
G(1 ;2)
T(1 ;2)
at the NE is greater289
than the ratio of the change in intake to the change in time duration. Formally,290
G (1; 

2)
T (1; 

2)
>
DG (1)
DT (1)
(8)
for all 1 with DT (1) > 0.291
\{Rule of time average" If the forager's strategy change decreases the time292
duration (i.e. DT (1) < 0), the average intake rate
G(1 ;2)
T(1 ;2)
at the NE is less than293
the ratio of the change in intake to the change in time duration. Formally,294
G (1; 

2)
T (1; 

2)
<
DG (1)
DT (1)
(9)
for all 1 with DT (1) < 0.295
In the following two Remarks, we show that the zero-one rule and Charnov's296
marginal value theorem are valid at the forager's NE (p;  ) of the dispersal-foraging297
game. These results follow from considering NE behavior with respect to p and  298
respectively, assuming prey behavior is xed at their NE strategy s.299
Remark 1 (Zero-one rule). If the forager encounters an Ai type patch, it is300
faced with the question: use or not this patch? That is, it must decide on pi . If it301
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does use the patch, it spends time  i there. A straightforward calculation shows that302
changing its strategy to pi results in
DG(pi;

i )
DT (pi;i )
=
gi(s
;x;i )
i
. Since this is independent303
of the choice of pi, the rule of time average (8) yields304
pi = 1 if
gi(s
; xi;  i )
 i
> 	(s; p;  ): (10)
That is, an encountered patch Ai is used with probability 1 if the resultant energy305
intake rate once in this patch is greater than the forager energy intake rate from all306
patches. Similarly, pi = 0 if the inequality in (10) is reversed. This is the well-known307
zero-one rule (Charnov 1976a) that either a given patch type is always entered when308
encountered or never entered.309
Remark 2 (Marginal value theorem). Consider a forager who has spend310
i in an Ai patch (thus p

i = 1) and has collected energy gi(s
; x; i) from there.311
Now the question of the forager is: leave or not from this patch? If the forager312
spends extra time in this used patch, an easy calculation shows that DT = dii313
and DG = di [gi(s
; x; i +i)  gi(s; x; ; i)]. Using (8) we nd that the forager314
does not leave if gi(s
;x;i+i) gi(s;x;i)
i
> 	(s; p;  ) which implies the well-known315
Charnov's marginal value theorem (Charnov 1976b):316
d
di
gi(s
; x;  i ) = 	(s
; p;  ): (11)
That is, the forager leaves the patch at that time where its energy intake rate once317
in the patch matches its energy intake rate from all patches.318
4 Dynamic solution concept based on game dy-319
namics320
The above static solution concept (and its dynamic characterization in Appendix C)321
is based on the assumption that only one player can change its strategy at a time.322
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There are three problems with this approach. The rst is that it assumes there is a323
separation of time scales between behavioral changes by prey compared to that of324
the predator. In biology, there is no general reason for ruling out that these counter325
interested agents change their strategies on the same time scale. Secondly, random326
perturbation cannot be excluded in biology and so no \player" keeps his strategy327
unchanged. Thirdly, forager and prey can adjust their behaviors to the opponent's328
current strategy immediately (see e.g. Juliana et al. 2011; Katz et al. 2010, 2013).329
Hence, solutions given by the Nash paradigm need to be examined to see if they330
correspond to the expected outcome of the real biological system. This situation331
can be treated by game dynamics that describe the behavior changes of prey and332
forager, leading to the following concept.333
Game dynamic solution concept: a strategy pair (or a behavior cycle) is a dy-334
namic solution if it is locally asymptotically stable with respect to a game dynamics335
describing the behavior changes of prey and forager.336
Since DFG game is a mixture of evolutionary and classical games, we must337
combine two dierent type of game dynamics. For the prey species we use the repli-338
cator dynamics (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Garay 2003) whereby the proportion339
of prey in a given patch increases if and only if prey have higher payo in this patch.340
_s = s(1  s) [1(s; x; p; )  2(s; x; p; )] : (12)
From Appendix C, an IFD s will be stable with respect to (12) at xed (p; ) if341
and only if it is an ESS of the prey habitat selection game.342
Secondly, we focus on the dynamic stability of the forager's NE behavior, when343
the prey strategy is xed at s. Since there is only one forager, the classical adaptive344
dynamics cannot be applied (specically, adaptive dynamics is either based on pop-345
ulation structure (Dieckmann and Law 1996; Vincent and Brown 2005) or relative346
advantage (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998)). For this reason, we use the following347
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partial adaptive dynamics (Garay 2002) which moves the foraging strategy in the348
direction of higher predator payo.349
_p1 = p1(1  p1)@	(s; p1; p2; 1; 2)
@p1
(13)
_p2 = p2 (1  p2) @	(s; p1; p2; 1; 2)
@p2
(14)
_1 = 1
@	(s; p1; p2;1; 2)
@1
(15)
_2 = 2
@	(s; p1; p2; 1; 2)
@2
(16)
In Appendix C, we show that optimal foraging behavior (p;  ) at xed s cor-350
responds exactly to a locally asymptotically stable rest point under this predator351
dynamics.352
However, it is important to emphasize that the above combined predator-prey353
dynamics describes the way the counter-interested \players" (prey population and354
forager) simultaneously change their strategies according to the opponents' current355
strategies. The game dynamic solution is then a locally asymptotically stable rest356
point (s; p;  ) of (12), (13), (14), (15) and (16). In cases where such a rest point357
does not exist but a stable behavior cycle emerges, this cycle is also considered a358
solution to the game dynamics.359
5 Results: Comparison of the two solution con-360
cepts361
To compare the static and dynamic solution concepts, we concentrate on the sit-362
uation when both patches are used by prey and by forager. That is, we assume363
that p1 = p2 = 1 and consider the rest points (s
;  1 ; 

2 ) of (12), (15) and (16) with364
0 < s < 1, and  1 ; 

2 both positive. The combined dynamics is then365
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_s = s(1  s) [1   2]
_1 =
1d1
E()

d
d1
g1  	

(17)
_2 =
2d2
E()

d
d2
g2  	

:
It is clear that, if (s;  1 ; 

2 ) is a dynamic solution of DFG, then s
 a static solution366
for the prey (i.e. it satises inequality (5) since 1 = 2 at (s
;  1 ; 

2 )). However, as367
we will see in the following two sections that use Holling type III and II functional368
responses respectively with respect to prey density in each patch type, the converse369
is not true. These results rely on the convexity/concavity of the gain gi(xi(s); i) in370
patch i as a function of patch density xi(s) and as a function of patch leaving time371
i.372
As a partial summary of the results we obtain, if gi(xi(s); i) is convex in xi(s)373
at s and locally concave in 1 and 2 at ( 1 ; 

2 ), then s
 is stable (i.e. an ESS)374
for the prey dynamics (12) and ( 1 ; 

2 ) is stable for the predator adaptive dynamics375
(15) and (16). Global concavity in 1 and 2 implies (

1 ; 

2 ) is the optimal foraging376
behavior when prey strategy is xed at s. On the other hand, if gi(xi(s); i) is377
concave in xi(s), then s
 is an unstable for the prey dynamics (12). These dynamic378
stability results assume that only one player changes its strategy at a time whereas379
the dynamic solution concept allows both predator and prey to change strategies380
at the same time. The consequences of this are examined in the following two381
subsection.382
5.1 Holling III gain functions383
If the energy gain gi(xi(s); i) is a convex function of patch density xi(s) for i = 1; 2384
as occurs for Holling III functional responses when prey density in patch type i385
is low, then prey payo is a decreasing function of its density in each patch (i.e.386
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gi(xi(s);i)
xi(s)
is an increasing function of xi(s)). In this case, Fretwell and Lucas (1969)387
show that there will be a unique IFD. In fact, Cressman and Krivan (2006) prove388
this IFD is an ESS. Intuitively, if the forager's strategy does not change, then the389
stability of the prey rest point is guaranteed by the following: if the local prey390
density decreases in patch A1 and increases in patch A2 then the individual survival391
rate in patch A1 increases and in patch A2 decreases, and vice versa. In other words,392
if a prey individual moves to the other patch, then its survival rate decreases. The393
IFD is then a stable equilibrium of the prey dynamics (12) for xed patch leaving394
times 1 and 2 of the predator. For large prey density in both patch types, this395
is no longer the case as we will see in the following subsection on Holling II gain396
functions.397
For the predator dynamics, we have an optimization problem in the patch leav-398
ing times 1 and 2 (see Appendix C). Since both leaving times 

1 and 

2 are positive,399
local asymptotic stability with respect to perturbations in the predator population400
(i.e. stability under the predator dynamics (15) and (16)) is equivalent to the preda-401
tor gain functions gi(xi(s); i) in both patches being concave in the leaving times402
at the equilibrium (s;  1 ; 

2 ) (i.e. gi(xi(s); i) is locally concave in i for i = 1; 2).403
Conversely, if these gain functions are globally concave in patch leaving time, then a404
stable rest point of the predator dynamics corresponds to optimal foraging behavior.405
Gain functions of the form gi(xi; i) = aix
2
i i=(x
2
i + aixii + ai) with ai positive406
are typical Holling III functional responses in prey density xi (i.e. convex in the local407
prey density xi when xi is small and become concave for larger xi) that increase to408
the saturated consumption level of aii at large prey density. They are also globally409
concave in leaving time i with all prey consumed if the predator stays in this patch410
type suciently long. Thus, if (s;  1 ; 

2 ) is a rest point of the (17), then the prey411
NE s is an ESS for small values of x but not an ESS for large values of x when the412
forager strategy is xed at ( 1 ; 

2 ) as shown in Figure 2a. In fact, for the parameters413
chosen in this gure, there are two interior ESSs (blue curves) for large x. These,414
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however, are not associated with equilibria of DFG since the equilibrium forager415
strategy corresponding to these values of s is not ( 1 ; 

2 ).416
There is consistency with these NE results and the stability of (s;  1 ; 

2 ) under417
(17) in that the game dynamic solution is a stable equilibrium for small values of x418
and a stable limit cycle for large x (Figure 2b). That is, this bifurcation diagram is419
qualitatively what is expected in that the static solution concept (s;  1 ; 

2 ) is locally420
asymptotically stable for small x and unstable for large x. However, the transition421
value of x from stability to instability of s (found numerically to be x = 1:3 in Figure422
2a) is dierent than the transition value of x = 1:66 from stability to instability of423
(s;  1 ; 

2 ) in Figure 2b. Specically, for intermediate total population size x, we424
nd (s;  1 ; 

2 ) is stable under (17) even though the static prey solution would be425
unstable without the stabilizing eect of the forager's behavior. In these cases, there426
is a discrepancy between the static solution concept and the game dynamic solution.427
Observe that, in cases where stable behavior cycles emerge as the game dynamic428
solution, neither prey nor forager keep a xed behavior but instead each replies to429
the actual behavior of the other. Furthermore, as can be shown numerically, the430
average prey behavior over one behavioral cycle is dierent than the equilibrium431
value s, an outcome that contrasts with known results (Hofbauer and Sigmund432
1998) for population density cycles in predator-prey interactions based on Lotka-433
Volterra models and for the behavioral cycles of the classical battle-of-the-sexes434
game.435
5.2 Holling II gain functions436
Now suppose that prey payo is an increasing function of its density in each type437
of patch (e.g. gi(xi(s); i) are concave functions of xi(s) for i = 1; 2 as occurs for438
Holling II functional responses). Then prey survival in patch type i is at a maximum439
if all prey are in this patch. Thus, there is at least one IFD with all prey in the same440
patch type and this is also an ESS (see Appendix C). There may also be a second441
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Figure 2: Trajectories of the game dynamics for typical Holling III gain functions
of the form gi(xi; i) = aix
2
i i=(x
2
i + aixii + ai) where a1 = 0:3 and a2 = 0:5. (a)
The prey replicator dynamics with predator strategy xed at ( 1 ; 

2 ) as a function
of x. The interior equilibrium s is globally stable until x = 1:3 (blue solid curve)
and then becomes unstable for x > 1:3 (dashed red curve), in which case the prey
evolve to dierent mixed equilibria of (12) (i.e. the solid blue curves) that are locally
asymptotically stable but do not correspond to rest points of (17). (b) For x < 1:66,
trajectories of (17) approach the equilibrium (s;  1 ; 

2 ) on the solid black curve
with mixed NE s. For larger x, the trajectories approach a stable limit cycle (i.e.
one of the solid blue curves) and the equilibrium (s;  1 ; 

2 ) is unstable (indicated
by one of the points on the dotted red curve). Thus, for intermediate values of x
(i.e. 1:3 < x < 1:66), (s;  1 ; 

2 ) is stable even though s
 is an unstable NE of the
prey habitat selection game. Other parameters y1 = y2 = 1;  = 0:5; 0 = 0:4; d1 =
d2 =
1
2
; c = 0.
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ESS with all prey in the other patch type. In this latter case, there will be a third442
IFD with prey in both patch types (corresponding to (s;  1 ; 

2 )) but this will not be443
an ESS since, intuitively, concavity means that, at this IFD, if a prey moves to the444
other patch, then its survival rate increases. That is, although the IFD with prey in445
both patch types is a NE, it is not stable with respect to perturbations in the prey446
population (i.e. it is not stable under the prey dynamics (12)). This phenomenon447
is discussed by Fretwell and Lucas (1969) and raises the question whether such an448
s should be considered an IFD (see Appendix C).449
Gain functions of the form gi(xi; i) = aixii=(xi + aii + 1) with ai positive are450
typical Holling II functional responses in prey density xi (i.e. globally concave in xi)451
that increase to the saturated consumption level of aii at large prey density. Thus,452
if (s;  1 ; 

2 ) is a rest point of the (17), then the prey NE s
 is not an ESS when453
the forager strategy is xed at ( 1 ; 

2 ) (see Figure 3a). In fact, for the parameters454
chosen in this gure, there are two ESSs, both of which have all prey in one patch455
type. On the other hand, as in Section 5.1, these gain functions are globally concave456
in leaving time i with all prey consumed if the predator stays in this patch type457
suciently long. That is, ( 1 ; 

2 ) is a stable rest point of the predator dynamics458
when prey strategy is xed at s.459
From the above discussion, we expect (s;  1 ; 

2 ) to be unstable under (17).460
However, as seen in Figure 3b, (s;  1 ; 

2 ) is in fact stable under (17) (i.e. it is a461
game dynamic solution) for large total population size x. This example shows more462
clearly than Figure 2 that a game dynamic equilibrium solution may not be a stable463
static solution for the prey population (i.e. s may not be stable for (12)). We464
can say that forager behavior stabilizes the mixed prey distributions, since if the465
forager's strategies are xed then the prey population will use only one patch.466
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Figure 3: Trajectories of the game dynamics for typical Holling II gain functions of
the form gi(xi; i) = aixii=(xi+aii+1) where a1 = 0:9 and a2 = 0:8. (a) The prey
dynamics with predator strategy xed at ( 1 ; 

2 ) as a function of x. The interior
equilibrium s is unstable (dashed red curve) and the prey evolve to all be in one
patch (i.e. the blue lines that are locally asymptotically stable). (b) Bifurcation
diagram with respect to total prey population size x for the game dynamics (17).
For small values of x, trajectories of (17) approach a stable limit cycle (i.e. one of
the solid blue curves). In particular, the equilibrium (s;  1 ; 

2 ) on the dotted red
curve with mixed NE s is not stable (which is consistent with the instability of
s for the static prey solution concept in panel a). On the other hand, for larger
values of x, trajectories of (17) approach the stable equilibrium (s;  1 ; 

2 ) on the
solid black curve, a result that is unexpected from the static solution concept. Other
parameters y1 = y2 = 1;  = 0:8; 0 = 0:4; d1 = d2 =
1
2
; c = 0.
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6 Discussion467
The Dispersal-Foraging Game is the union of optimal foraging theory and the IFD,468
where a prey's payo function is its survival rate and the forager's payo is the469
number of prey killed per unit time. We studied two dierent solution concepts470
for DFG. The static NE concept (Section 3) is an equilibrium (s;  1 ; 

2 ) that is a471
straightforward union of requirements that s be an IFD of the prey habitat selection472
game and that, at this IFD, the predator adopts its optimal foraging behavior.473
The dynamic concept looks for a stable solution of the game dynamics (either an474
asymptotically stable rest point or a stable cycle of (17)). A fundamental dierence475
between these static and dynamic solution concepts is that the Nash assumption476
(i.e. only one player can change its strategy at a time) implicitly precludes the477
possibility of behavior cyclic solutions.478
The game-theoretic NE condition is especially important when applied to the479
predator's behavior. Specically, we showed how this leads to the rule of time480
averages: the optimal predator behavior involves those activities that ensure larger481
time average intake than the time average of all activities. Both the zero-one-rule and482
Charnov's marginal value theorem of optimal foraging theory then follow directly483
from our rule of time averages.484
Furthermore, since the static solution is a rest point of the combined predator-485
prey game dynamics, there are cases when both solution concepts give the same486
prediction: i.e.. when the NE is locally asymptotically stable with respect to the487
game dynamics.488
However, we have also shown that the two solution concepts can be quite dif-489
ferent. As an important example, when both gain functions are concave in patch490
prey density (like Holling II), then the static solution predicts that prey use only491
one patch type, whereas the game dynamic solution predicts mixed habitat use (see492
Figure 3b where either the combined dynamics leads to a stable equilibrium or to a493
stable limit cycle). The intuitive reason for this outcome is that, when prey use only494
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one patch type, the forager consequently also concentrates on this patch. This leads495
to the other patch becoming a prey \refuge" prey based on the forager's behavior496
and so prey start to use this patch as well. Similar discrepancies between the two497
solution concepts arise for Holling III gain functions (see Figure 2).498
In practice, the dynamical solution can guarantee that the prey use both patch499
types more often than classical approaches based on the IFD.500
We also emphasize that the behavioral cycles we observe in our models based501
on prey IFD and predator optimal foraging occur at xed density. This shows502
that, not only should we expect cycling in predator-prey population sizes over long503
periods of time, game-theoretic reasoning predicts individual behavior often cycles504
over short time intervals when population size can be assumed to be xed. Our505
observations illustrate that total prey density displays a \behavior bifurcation eect"506
in the sense that by increasing density, stable behavior equilibrium becomes stable507
behavior cycles (Figure 3), or vice versa (Figure 2). This phenomenon is parallel508
with the \paradox of enrichment" known in population ecology (Rosenzweig 1971),509
where increasing the carrying capacity of prey causes a bifurcation.510
It should also be noted that, although the bifurcations from stable equilibrium511
behavior to stable cyclic behavior that we observed use total prey density as the512
bifurcation parameter, bifurcations occur in other model parameters as well.513
Below we recall some biological considerations and examples which serve to514
justify our dynamical solution concept.515
Firstly, we agree with Lima (2002) that \ ... some failures of standard optimal516
diet theory" (Sih and Christensen 2001), and standard IFD theory (e.g. Julliar517
2000) \might be explicable in terms of a predator-prey game." The dynamic concept518
provides new insights into these prey-predator systems, where prey behavior and519
the forager's strategies together determine a high killing rate, and neither optimal520
foraging theory nor IFD t with observations. These issues also arise in applied521
ecology. Specically, it is generally acknowledged that optimal foraging theory and522
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IFD are important for biological control of pests (Mills and Wajnberg 2008). The523
utilization of phytoseiid predatory mites as biological control agents is widespread524
(Vila and Cabello 2014). However, the dispersion of spider mites (e.g. Tetranychus525
urticae) between patches is not an IFD, since the reproductive success varies between526
habitats (Julliar 2000). At the same time, predatory mites of Phytoseiidae (Acari)527
have not adapted to optimal foraging (Konakandla 2006; Gontijo et al. 2010; Maeda528
2010 ; van der Hammen et al. 2012). In the following two examples the above pest-529
predator system exists with habitat heterogeneity. First, in the USA, apple orchards530
in Utah, whose total ground vegetation cover was at least 50%, had predatory mite531
populations that suced to keep pest mites below their damaging levels (Alston532
1994). Second, spider mites (Tetranychus kanzawai) in deciduous fruit tree orchards533
in Japan usually overwinter on ground vegetation. In the spring, they rst increase534
their populations on the vegetation, and then move onto fruit trees. The predator535
P. persimilis, released onto groundcover, may eliminate spider mites before they536
migrate onto fruit trees (Takahashi et al. 1998; Takafuji and Amano 2001). In537
similar situations, it can be tested by eld trials whether game theory leads to a538
deeper understanding of predation, especially whether stable behavior cycles should539
occur when optimal foraging theory and/or IFD do not predict observed behavior.540
Finally, Holling II functional responses are very common in nature (e.g. Hassell541
et al. 1976) and so the shape of the gain function used in Figure 3 is quite realistic. In542
this case, prey use only one patch type at classic IFD/ESS, whereas the forager can543
stabilize the prey's mixed habitat use at the game dynamic solution. The existence544
of such examples is a strong argument to justify the dynamic solution concept.545
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7 Appendix550
In the Appendix, we only consider non-degenerate gain functions. In particular, we551
assume that @
2
@s2
gi(s; x; i) 6= 0 and @2@2i gi(s; x; i) 6= 0.552
8 Appendix A: Derivation of functional response553
with xed prey's and forager's strategies554
Following Holling (1959), we calculate the average amount of food consumed by555
the predator during a time period T . The functional response is dened by a time556
average during a foraging time duration T . Garay and Mori (2010) show that the557
average number of j-th activity Zj during T is558
E(Zj) =
T
E()
Pj (18)
where Pj denotes the probability of the j-th activity. The intuitive background of559
(18) is the following. If, during time period T , the encounter probabilities do not560
change, then the average time of one activity is the expected time, E(), of an561
activity chosen at random. Thus, the average expected number of activities during562
T is T
E()
, and according to the assumption of independent repetitions, Pj is the part563
of the expected activity that belongs the j-th one. It is straightforward to obtain564
the payo function (3) from this.565
Another mathematical derivation of functional response and/or intake rate is566
based on renewal theory (e.g. Johns and Miller 1963) that uses the limit as the567
time duration tends to innity. Although this does not match with our assumptions568
on T , other authors consider renewal cycles with short renewal time period (e.g.569
McNamara 1985; McNamara and Houston 1999). An issue then arises: if used570
patches are quickly renewed (e.g. renewal time is shorter than the searching time),571
the forager will optimize energy intake by staying in the richest patch type once one572
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is encountered and so obtain an expected payo greater than (3) by also decreasing573
the total searching time during T .574
9 Appendix B: Rule of time average for forager575
Consider a two-person formal game (S1; S2;  1;  2), where the payo function of the576
rst player is dened as a time average of income, formally  1 (1; 2) :=
G(1;2)
T (1;2)
;577
where time duration function T : (1; 2)! R gives the time duration corresponding578
to the players' decisions; and income function G : (1; 2)! R gives income deter-579
mined by these decisions as well. The well known strict Nash equilibrium condition580
(Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998) is the following: for all (1; 2) 6= (1; 2)581
 1 (

1; 

2) >  1 (1; 

2)
 2 (

1; 

2) >  2 (

1; 2) :
From now on, we will concentrate exclusively on the time average payo function582
 1 of the rst player and introduce the following notation DG (1) := G (1; 

2) 583
G (1; 

2) and DT (1) := T (1; 

2)  T (1; 2).584
Equation (7) in the main text is equivalent to each of the following inequalities585
(G (1; 

2) G (1; 2))T (1; 2) < (T (1; 2)  T (1; 2))G (1; 2)
G (1; 

2)T (

1; 

2) < T (1; 

2)G (

1; 

2)
G (1; 

2)
T (1; 2)
<
G (1; 

2)
T (1; 

2)
 1 (1; 

2) <  1 (

1; 

2) :
That is, (1; 

2) is a strict NE if and only if DG (1)T (

1; 

2) < DT (1)G (

1; 

2)586
holds for all 1 6= 1. Furthermore, if DT (1) > 0 (i.e. T (1; 2) > T (1; 2) > 0),587
then
G(1 ;2)
T(1 ;2)
> DG(1)
DT (1)
and, similarly, if DT (1) < 0 (i.e. T (

1; 

2) > T (1; 

2) >588
0), then
G(1 ;2)
T(1 ;2)
< DG(1)
DT (1)
. That is, we have589
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Case 1. If T (1; 

2) > T (

1; 

2) > 0 then
G(1 ;2)
T(1 ;2)
> DG(1)
DT (1)
590
Case 2. If T (1; 

2) > T (1; 

2) > 0 then
G(1 ;2)
T(1 ;2)
< DG(1)
DT (1)
591
and these correspond to the +Rule of time average and  Rule of time average592
respectively as stated in the main text.593
31
10 Appendix C: Dynamical characterization of stat-594
ic solution of DFG595
Now the question arises: What kind of stability property does the static solution596
concept possess, under the basic Nash assumption that one player can change it-597
s strategy while the other keeps its strategy at equilibrium)? The following two598
subsections consider this question for the prey and the predator respectively.599
10.1 Prey solution600
In Section 4, we claim that an IFD s for the prey population at xed predator601
strategy (p;  ) will be stable with respect to the replicator equation,602
_s = s(1  s) [1(s; x; p;  )  2(s; x; p;  )] ; (19)
if and only if it is an ESS of the prey habitat selection game.603
When there are two patch types, this game (Cressman et al. 2004) has two604
pure strategies; namely, choose patch Ai (which we label strategy Ai) for i = 1; 2.605
The payo to strategy Ai is the survival probability i(s; x; p; ) when the prey606
population has strategy s. Then, the expected payo of an individual prey who uses607
strategy s0 (i.e. a prey that spends s0 and 1   s0 of its time in A1 and A2 patches608
respectively) is609
s0 (s)  s01(s; x; p;  ) + (1  s0)2(s; x; p;  ): (20)
s is an ESS (Maynard Smith 1982) if a resident prey population using strate-610
gy s cannot be invaded by a small mutant subpopulation using strategy s0. If "611
is the proportion of the mutant subpopulation, then the resident-mutant system612
has proportion (1   ")s + "s0 of the prey in patch A1. The mutant cannot in-613
vade if its payo is less than that of s whenever " is suciently small (i.e. if614
s0 ((1  ")s + "s0) < s ((1  ")s + "s0)). From (20), this is equivalent to615
(s0   s) (1((1  ")s + "s0; x; p;  )  2((1  ")s + "s0; x; p;  )) < 0 (21)
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for all " suciently small.616
We rst consider the case when 0 < s < 1. From (21), 1(s; x; p;  ) =617
2(s
; x; p;  ) (i.e. s is an IFD/NE since prey have the same survival probability618
in both occupied patches). Furthermore, this NE will be an ESS if and only if619
@
@s
(1(s; x; p
;  )  2(s; x; p;  )) < 0: (22)
(Note that the degenerate condition where this derivative is 0 is assumed not to620
occur.) Since (22) is equivalent to the linearization of (19) at s having negative621
eigenvalue (i.e. s(1   s) @
@s
(1(s; x; p
;  )  2(s; x; p;  )) js=s< 0), s is stable622
if and only if it is an ESS.623
Next, suppose s = 1. Then s0 < s and so (21) will be true if and only if624
1(1; x; p
;  ) > 2(1; x; p;  ) (where the degenerate condition 1(1; x; p;  ) =625
2(1; x; p
;  ) is assumed not to occur). That is, s is an ESS if and only if it626
is a strict NE. It is also clear that _s > 0 for s close to s = 1 if and only if627
1(1; x; p
;  ) > 2(1; x; p;  ). The analogous results hold for s = 0 and so, for628
all 0  s  1, s is an ESS if and only if it is stable under the replicator equation.629
From (4),
@
@s
1(s; x; p
;  ) =   d1p

1
0 + d1p1

1 + d2p

2

2
y1
x

@g1(s; x; 

1 )
@s
  g1(s; x; 

1 )
s

for 0 < s  1. Since g1(0; x;  1 ) = 0, g1(s;x;

1 )
s
is the slope of the line from the origin630
to (s; g1(s; x; 

1 )) and so
@
@s
1(s; x; p
;  ) < 0 if g1(s;x;

1 )
s
is an increasing function of631
s (i.e. if g1(s; x; 

1 ) is a convex function of s). Similarly, if g2(s; x; 

2 ) is a convex632
function of s, @
@s
2(s; x; p
;  ) > 0 since this is equivalent to @g2(s;x;

2 )
@s
+
g2(s;x;2 )
1 s < 0.633
Thus, if both gain functions are convex in s, there is a unique IFD and it is an ESS.634
On the other hand, if both gain functions are concave in s, then @
@s
1(s; x; p
;  ) >635
0 and @
@s
2(s; x; p
;  ) < 0 for all 0 < s < 1. If 1(1; x; p;  ) > 2(1; x; p;  ),636
then s = 1 is an ESS. Otherwise 1(0; x; p;  ) < 1(1; x; p;  )  2(1; x; p;  ) <637
2(0; x; p
;  ) and so s = 0 is an ESS. If both 1(1; x; p;  ) > 2(1; x; p;  ) and638
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1(0; x; p
;  ) < 2(0; x; p;  ), both pure strategies are ESSs and there is a unique639
0 < s < 1 for which 1(s; x; p;  ) = 2(s; x; p;  ). This s is an IFD but640
not an ESS since @
@s
(1(s; x; p
;  )  2(s; x; p;  )) > 0 at s. It should be noted641
here that some authors (Krivan et al. 2008) question whether this latter unstable642
s should be called an IFD. Consequences for the expected prey behavior in such643
circumstances have been considered by Morris (2002) and more recently by Krivan644
(2014) and Tran and Cressman (2015).645
10.2 Predator solution646
At xed prey strategy s, the predator faces an optimization problem. From the647
predator dynamics (13-16), d	(s
;p;)
dt
is given by648
@	(s; p; )
@p1
dp1
dt
+
@	(s; p; )
@p2
dp2
dt
+
@	(s; p; )
@1
d1
dt
+
@	(s; p; )
@2
d2
dt
= p1(1  p1)

@	(s; p; )
@p1
2
+ p2(1  p2)

@	(s; p; )
@p2
2
+1

@	(s; p; )
@1
2
+ 2

@	(s; p; )
@2
2
 0:
That is, 	(s; p; ) is a Lyapunov function for this dynamics and so every tra-649
jectory converges to E  f(p; ) j d	(s;p;)
dt
= 0g (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998).650
Moreover, any strict local maximum of 	(s; p; ) is a locally asymptotically stable651
rest point and any (connected) set of local maxima is locally asymptotically stable.652
In particular, the set of strategies corresponding to optimal foraging behavior (i.e.653
f(p;  ) j 	(s; (p;  ))  	(s; p; ) for all (p; )g) is locally asymptotically stable.654
To provide more details for the stability of the predator dynamics, notice that E655
consists of the set of rest points of the predator dynamics at xed prey strategy s.656
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Consider the following partial derivatives of 	(s; p; ) = d1p1g1(s
;x;1)+d2p2g2(s;x;2) c
0+d1p11+d2p22
,657
@	(s; p; )
@p1
=
d1g1(s
; x; 1) (0 + d2p22)  (d2p2g2(s; x; 2)  c) d11
(0 + d1p11 + d2p22)
2 (23)
@	(s; p; )
@1
=
0@ d1p1 @g1(s;x;1)@1 (0 + d1p11 + d2p22)
  (d1p1g1(s; x; 1) + d2p2g2(s; x; 2)  c) d1p1
1A
(0 + d1p11 + d2p22)
2
=
d1p1
0 + d1p11 + d2p22

@g1(s
; x; 1)
@1
 	(s; p; )

: (24)
All points with p = (p1; p

2) = (0; 0) are rest points in E. However, these all658
correspond to the minimum value   c
0
of 	(s; p; ) (i.e. 	(s; (p; ))  	(s; p; )659
if for all (p; )). Thus, no trajectory converges to this subset of E unless the initial660
value of 	(s; p; ) is also at this minimum.661
Now suppose that, at some point in E, p = (p1; p

2) = (p

1; 0) with p

1 6= 0.662
Since the sign of @	(s
;p;)
@p1
in (23) does not depend on p1, the zero-one rule ap-663
plies and so p1 = 1 (since p

1 6= 0). Then (p; ) for some  is in E if and only if664
1
@	(s;p;)
@1
= 0. Since 1 = 0 again corresponds to the minimum value of 	(s
; p; ),665
stability of (p;  ) implies that  1 > 0. Then, from (24),
@g1(s;x;1)
@1
= 	(s; p; )666
(i.e. Charnov's marginal value theorem (11) holds in patch 1). Moreover, stabil-667
ity on this boundary implies that @
2	(s;p;)
@21
< 0 at (p;  ). Furthermore, from668
(24),  1
@2	(s;p;)
@21
=
d1p1
0+d1p1

1+d2p

2

2
@2g1(s;x;1)
@21
at (p;  ) since @	(s
;p;)
@1
= 0 and669
@g1(s;x;1)
@1
  	(s; p; ) = 0 there. Thus, if this (p;  ) is stable, the gain function670
g1(s
; x; i) is concave in 1. A similar argument applies when p = (p1; p

2) = (0; p

2)671
with p2 6= 0.672
Finally, consider a point (p;  ) in E where the zero-one rule implies that
p = (p1; p

2) = (1; 1). If 

i = 0 for some i = 1; 2, then (p
;  ) is equivalent to
a point in E with pi = 0 and so the analysis of the preceding paragraph applies.
Thus, we assume that the patch leaving times  i are both positive from now on.
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The linearization of (13-16) is26666664
 @	(s;p;)
@p1
0 0 0
0  @	(s;p;)
@p2
0 0
   1 @
2	(s;p;)
@21
0
  0  2 @
2	(s;p;)
@22
37777775
where all partial derivatives are evaluated at (p;  ). (Here, we use the facts that673
@2	(s;p;)
@1@2
=   d1
0+d11+d2

2
@	(s;p;)
@2
= 0 at (p;  ) and that the entries indicated by674
an asterisk (*) are not needed for the analysis). From the zero-one rule, @	(s
;p;)
@p1
> 0675
and @	(s
;p;)
@p2
> 0. Thus, all eigenvalues are negative at (p;  ) if and only if676
 i
@2	(s;p;)
@2i
< 0 for i = 1; 2. That is, (p;  ) is locally asymptotically stable if and677
only if both gain functions gi(s
; x; i) are concave in i. In particular, this will be678
true if (p;  ) is the absolute maximum value of 	(s; p; ) (i.e. the optimal foraging679
behavior when prey strategy is xed at s). (Note that we are assuming that the680
degenerate condition @
2	(s;p;)
@2i
= 0 does not occur.)681
References682
Abrams, P. A. 2010. Implications of exible foraging for interspecic interactions:683
lessons from simple models. Functional Ecology 24:7{17.684
Abrams, P. A., R. Cressman, and V. Krivan. 2007. The role of behavioral dynam-685
ics in determining the patch distributions of interacting species. The American686
Naturalist 169:505{518.687
Abrams, P. A., and H. Matsuda. 2004. Consequences of behavioral dynamics for688
the population dynamics of predator-prey systems with switching. Population689
Ecology 46:13{25.690
Alston, D. G. 1994. Eect of apple oor vegetation on density and dispersal of691
36
phytophagous and predaceous mites in Utah. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Envi-692
ronment 50:73{84.693
Broom, M., and J. Rychtar. 2013. Game-Theoretical Models in Biology, Chapman &694
Hall/CRC Mathematical and Computational Biology. Chapman and Hall/CRC,695
Florida, USA.696
Brown, J. S., and B. P. Kotler. 2004. Hazardous duty pay and the foraging cost of697
predation. Ecology Letters 7:999{1014.698
Charnov, E. L. 1976a. Optimal foraging: Attack strategy of a mantid. The American699
Naturalist 110:141{151.700
|||. 1976b. Optimal foraging: The marginal value theorem. Theoretical Popu-701
lation Biology 9:129{136.702
Cressman, R., and J. Garay. 2009. A predator-prey refuge system: Evolutionary703
stability in ecological systems. Theoretical Population Biology 76:248{257.704
|||. 2011. The eects of opportunistic and intentional predators on the herding705
behavior of prey. Ecology 92:432{440.706
Cressman, R., and V. Krivan. 2006. Migration dynamics for the ideal free distribu-707
tion. The American Naturalist 168:384{397.708
|||. 2013. Two-patch population models with adaptive dispersal:the eects of709
varying dispersal speeds. Journal of Mathematical Biology 67:329{358.710
Cressman, R., V. Krivan, J. Brown, and J. Garay. 2014. Game-theoretic method-711
s for functional response and optimal foraging behavior. PLoS ONE 9:e88773.712
doi:10.1371/journal.pone. 0088773.713
37
Cressman, R., V. Krivan, and J. Garay. 2004. Ideal free distributions, evolutionary714
games, and population dynamics in multiple-species environments. The American715
Naturalist 164:473{489.716
Dieckmann, U., and R. Law. 1996. The dynamical theory of coevolution: a derivation717
from stochastic ecological processes. Journal of Mathematical Biology 34:579{612.718
Fretwell, D. S., and H. L. Lucas. 1969. On territorial behavior and other factors719
inuencing habitat distribution in birds. Acta Biotheoretica 19:16{32.720
Fryxell, J. M., and P. Lundberg. 1994. Diet choice and predator-prey dynamics.721
Evolutionary Ecology 8:407{421.722
|||. 1998. Individual Behaviour and Community Dynamics. Chapman and Hall,723
London, UK.724
Garay, J. 2002. Many species partial adaptive dynamics. BioSystems 65:19{23.725
|||. 2003. When does the variance of replicator tness decrease? Journal of726
Mathematical Biology 47:457{464.727
Garay, J., and F. T. Mori. 2010. When is predator's opportunism remunerative?728
Community Ecology 11:160{170.729
Garay, J., and Z. Varga. 2011. Survivor's dilemma: Defend the group or ee?730
Theoretical Population Biology 80:217{225.731
Gontijo, L. M., D. C. Margolies, J. R. Nechols, and R. A. Cloyd. 2010. Plant archi-732
tecture, prey distribution and predator release strategy interact to aect foraging733
eciency of the predatory mite Phytoseiulus persimilis (Acari: Phytoseiidae) on734
cucumber. Biological Control 53:136{141.735
38
Hassell, M. P., J. H. Lawton, and J. R. Beddington. 1976. The components of736
arthropod predation. 1. The prey deathrate. Journal of Animal Ecology 45:135{737
164.738
Hofbauer, J., and K. Sigmund. 1998. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics.739
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.740
Holling, C. S. 1959. The components of predation as revealed by a study of small-741
mammal predation of the European pine sawy. The Canadian Entomologist742
91:293{320.743
Iwasa, Y., M. Higashi, and N. Yamamura. 1981. Prey distribution as a factor744
determining the choice of optimal foraging strategy. The American Naturalist745
117:710{723.746
Johns, M. V., and R. G. Miller. 1963. Average renewal loss rates. The Annals of747
Mathematical Statistics 34:396{401.748
Juliana, J. R. S., B. P. Kotler, J. S. Brown, S. Mukherjee, and A. Bouskila. 2011. The749
foraging response of gerbils to a gradient of owl numbers. Evolutionary Ecology750
Research 13:869{878.751
Julliar, R. 2000. Sex-specic dispersal in spatially varying environments leads to752
habitat-dependent evolutionarily stable ospring sex ratios. Behavioral Ecology753
11:421{428.754
Katz, M. W., Z. Abramsky, B. P. Kotler, O. Alteshtein, and M. L. Rosenzweig. 2010.755
Playing the waiting game: predator and prey in a test environment. Evolutionary756
Ecology Research 12:793{801.757
Katz, M. W., Z. Abramsky, B. P. Kotler, M. L. Rosenzweig, O. Alteshtein, and758
G. Vasserman. 2013. Optimal foraging of little egrets and their prey in a foraging759
game in a patchy environment. The American Naturalist 181:381{395.760
39
Konakandla, B. S. 2006. Genetics of foraging behavior of the predatory mite, Phy-761
toseiulus persimilis, M.Si. dissertation. Kansas State University, Kansas, USA.762
Krivan, V. 2014. The Allee-type ideal free distribution. Journal of Mathematical763
Biology 69:1497{1513.764
Krivan, V., R. Cressman, and C. Schneider. 2008. The ideal free distribution: A765
review and synthesis of the game theoretic perspective. Theoretical Population766
Biology 73:403{425.767
Lima, S. L. 2002. Putting predators back into behavioral predator{prey interactions.768
TREE 17:70{75.769
Maeda, T. 2010. Dierences in foraging strategies between populations of the preda-770
tory mite Neoseiulus womersleyi: correlation between olfactory response and dis-771
persal tendency, pp. 259-263. Sabelis M.W. and J. Bruin (eds.), Trends in Acarol-772
ogy: Proceedings of the 12th International Congress. Springer, Dordrecht, NL.773
Maynard Smith, J. 1982. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University774
Press, Cambridge.775
McNamara, J. 1982. Optimal patch use in a stochastic environment. Theoretical776
Population Biology 21:269{288.777
McNamara, J. M. 1985. An optimal sequential policy for controlling a markov778
renewal process. Journal of Applied Probability 22:324{335.779
McNamara, J. M., and A. I. Houston. 1999. Models of Adaptive Behaviour. Cam-780
bridge University Press, Cambridge.781
McNamara, J. M., A. I. Houston, and W. W. Weisser. 1993. Combining prey choice782
and patch use: What does rate-maximizing predict? Journal of Theoretical783
Biology 164:219{238.784
40
Mills, N. J., and E. Wajnberg. 2008. Optimal foraging behavior and ecient bio-785
logical control methods, pp. 3-43. Wajnberg E., C. Bernstein and J. van Alphen786
(eds.), Behavioral Ecology of Insect Parasitoids: From theoretical approaches to787
eld applications. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden, MA.788
Molina, M. M., M. A. Moreno-Armendariz, and J. C. S. T. Mora. 2013. On the spa-789
tial dynamics and oscillatory behavior of a predator-prey model based on cellular790
automata and local particle swarm optimization. Journal of Theoretical Biology791
336:173{184.792
Morris, D. 2002. Measuring the Allee eect: positive density dependence in small793
mammals. Ecology 83:14{20.794
Rosenzweig, M. 1971. Paradox of enrichment: destabilization of exploitation ecosys-795
tems in ecological time. Science 171:385{387.796
Sih, A., and B. Christensen. 2001. Optimal diet theory: when does it work, and797
when and why does it fail? Animal Behaviour 61:379{390.798
Stephens, D. W., and J. R. Krebs. 1986. Foraging Theory. Princeton University799
Press, Princeton.800
Stewart-Oaten, A. 1982. Minimax strategies for a predator-prey game. Theoretical801
Population Biology 22:410{424.802
Takafuji, A., and H. Amano. 2001. Biological control of insect pests in Japan.803
Extension Bulletin - Food and Fertilizer Technology Center for the Asian and804
Pacic Region (Taiwan). 0379{7587 499:17pp.805
Takahashi, F., M. Inoue, and A. Takafuji. 1998. Management of the spider-mite806
population in a vinylhouse vinery by releasing Phytoseiulus persimilis onto the807
ground cover. Japanese Journal of Applied Entomology and Zoology 42:71{76.808
41
Tran, T., and R. Cressman. 2015. The ideal free distribution and evolutionary809
stability in habitat selection games with linear tness and Allee eect in. Inter-810
disciplinary Topics in Applied Mathematics, Modeling and Computer Science, M.811
Cojocaru et al. (Eds.) ISBN: 978-3-319-12306-6.812
Turelli, M., J. H. Gillespie, and T. W. Schoener. 1982. The fallacy of the fallacy of813
the averages in ecological optimization theory. The American Naturalist 119:879{814
884.815
van der Hammen, T., M. Montserrat, M. W. Sabelis, A. M. de Roos, and A. Janssen.816
2012. Whether ideal free or not, predatory mites distribute so as to maximize817
reproduction. Oecologia 169:95{104.818
Vila, E., and T. Cabello. 2014. Biosystems engineering applied to greenhouse pest819
control, in print. In: Torres, I. and Guevara, R. (eds.), Biosystems engineering:820
Biofactories for food production in the XXI Century. Springer, Berlin, DE.821
Vincent, T. L., and J. S. Brown. 2005. Evolutionary game theory, natural selection,822
and Darwinian dynamics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.823
Wald, A. 1944. On cumulative sums of random variables. The Annals of Mathe-824
matical Statistics 15:283{296.825
